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Ever since their contemporary origins in the writings of C.S. 
Peirce and William James, pragmatist approaches to language 
have had problems (at least according to the critics) with ob-
jectivity. The basic problem of the pragmatist, who eschews 
commitments to substantial metaphysics such as the corre-
spondence theory of truth, is to show how our epistemic, lin-
guistic practices can be suitably constrained by how the world 
actually is in order for the practices to successfully, at least 
some of the time, represent the world, as opposed to merely 
“frictionlessly spinning in the void,” to borrow John McDow-
ell’s famous phrase. The reason why spinning is generally 
considered to be a bad thing is that it leaves the door open for 
foundational skepticism regarding the veracity of our asser-
tions and beliefs, with the close alternatives falling on the 
spectrum of anti-realism, deflationism, and quietism. 
The aim of this paper is to critically examine the concept of 
semantic objectivity inherent in Robert Brandom’s works, 
most importantly (1994/MIE). The reason for focusing on 
Brandom is that his ambitious aim is to combine the pragma-
tist preoccupation with our epistemic, justificational, linguis-
tic practices with a robust enough account of objectivity to 
meet at least some desiderata of traditional realist intuitions. 
His “deontic scorekeeping model” therefore offers a particu-
larly fruitful theoretical crossroads where the more abstract 
ideas above can break lances. 
The main interest of this paper is exegetical, namely to 
clarify the aims, arguments, and problems of the account of 
semantic objectivity that Brandom presents in MIE. Concern-
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ing Brandom’s theoretical aims, I shall argue that there is 
some discrepancy between his formal and informal character-
izations of the criteria by which his account is to be judged as 
adequate. In particular, it is not clear whether Brandom’s idea 
of semantic objectivity as a “structural feature” of the score-
keeping practice suffices to cash out his claim that what de-
termines semantic contents in a practice are the objects that 
claims made in the practice purport to represent. 
After expounding on the discrepancy, I shall propose to 
reconstruct a mostly implicit line of argument in MIE, high-
lighted by the more recent developments of Brandom’s work, 
which I think suffices to smooth it over. The missing piece for 
Brandom’s pragmatist quest for semantic objectivity is concep-
tual realism, or the idea that both subjects and objects can be 
understood as conceptually structured. While conceptual re-
alism only comes into explicit focus in Brandom’s later 
works, I shall show that the essential idea is already operative 
in MIE. 
Lastly, I shall note that although including conceptual real-
ism in the theory is arguably the best way to fix its internal 
discrepancies, the inclusion is problematic insofar as concep-
tual realism as a metaphysical thesis is in no way motivated 
independently in MIE. While I remain neutral in this paper as 
to the independent plausibility of conceptual realism, I will 
argue that it represents an important watershed between MIE 
and Brandom’s later works. 
The paper’s order of presentation starts with an outline of 
Brandom’s pragmatist project in the philosophy of language, 
with a focus on the problem of semantic objectivity and the 
internal discrepancy mentioned above (2). In section 3, I shall 
further specify the discrepancy and what it would take to 
overcome it. Section 4 will argue that the task is best left for 
the conceptual realism that Brandom further develops in his 
later works. Finally, in section 5, I will argue against certain 
alternative ways to secure semantic objectivity and represen-
tational purport in the scorekeeping practice that do not ap-
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2 The Core Architecture 
The most important technical and philosophical contribution 
of MIE is what Brandom calls “the deontic scorekeeping prac-
tice.” There are several ways one might approach the appa-
ratus, and the secondary literature already offers several 
thorough presentations (Wanderer 2008; Loeffler 2017). For 
the purposes of this paper, two of Brandom’s key claims are 
worth noting. The first is that assertions are primarily 
knowledge claims (MIE, 201). The second is that all three tra-
ditional main ingredients of knowledge—justification, propo-
sitional content, and truth—can be understood in terms of the 
deontic scorekeeping practice. 
The natural place to start is with propositional contents, 
“of the sort that we express by the use of declarative sentenc-
es and ascribe by the use of ‘that’ clauses” (MIE, 5). Brandom 
contrasts two major contemporary strategies of coming to 
grips with such contents, namely by their truth conditions or 
by their inferential roles, and opts squarely for the latter. 
Thus conceptual contents at large, including subsentential 
and unrepeatable token expressions, are to be explained in 
terms of their contribution to inferential relations, which are 
divided into three classes: commitment-preserving, entitlement-
preserving, and material incompatibility relations. 
These semantic relations are in turn offered a pragmatic 
explanation in terms of what it is for an interpreter (a “score-
keeper”) to take or treat herself and other subjects to be doing 
in drawing the aforementioned inferences expressed in asser-
tions, where the appropriate doings are rendered in a norma-
tive, deontic idiom of sanctions. Intertwined in his strategy 
are what Brandom has later distinguished as the doctrines of 
semantic and methodological pragmatism (2011, 58, 61). Briefly, 
the claim of methodological pragmatism is that the theoreti-
cal point or purpose of postulating “meanings” (i.e., proposi-
tional, conceptual contents) is to explain proprieties of use, or 
why is it that certain uses of a word are correct while others 
are incorrect.1 The main claim of semantic pragmatism in turn 
                                                 
1 For Brandom, “proprieties of use” primarily concerns the business of 
drawing material inferences, not applications, e.g., in an ostensive setting. 
Nonetheless, to simplify the terminology, for the purposes of this paper I 
shall use “application,” “use,” and “drawing inferences” as synonyms. 
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is the foundationalist one that what conjoins a token expres-
sion with its meaning is the use which the speaker (and her 
community) makes of the expression.2 
The paradigmatic move within the scorekeeping practice is 
to attribute a commitment to a claim (proposition) p. When 
attributing commitment p to a subject, the scorekeeper treats 
the subject not only as disposed to assert expressions of p, but 
also as obliged to uphold the claim in circumstances where 
p’s truth or the subject’s entitlement to it comes into question. 
Furthermore, along with p itself, the scorekeeper also attrib-
utes to the subject commitment to all the claims that he takes 
to be the material inferential entailments.3 These commitments 
are said to be undertaken by the subject, which is to say the 
subject herself may not acknowledge commitment to the same 
claims or their material entailments as her scorekeeper does. 
So, if the scorekeeper attributes to the subject commitment to 
the claim that “grass is green,” and if the scorekeeper treats 
“grass is green” as materially entailing the claim “grass is 
colored,” she will also treat the subject as committed to the 
claim that “grass is colored” whether the subject herself 
acknowledges commitment to either claim or not.4 
To be committed to a claim is one thing, and to be entitled 
(i.e., justified) to it is another. Two facets of entitlement are 
worth noting here: on the one hand, the default and challenge 
structure, and on the other, the two mechanisms by which one 
may become justified to a commitment. First, one may be-
come entitled (in the eyes of a scorekeeper) to a commitment 
by the intercontent mechanism of showing the committed 
claim as a material inferential consequence of commitments 
one already enjoys entitlement to. Second, one may become 
entitled to a commitment by the way of an interpersonal 
mechanism of deferring to another scorekeeper’s commit-
                                                 
2 Though Brandom does not distinguish between methodological and 
semantic pragmatism in MIE, the claims are independent of each other, 
yet clearly fit well in the same picture. 
3 The concept of material inference that Brandom inherits from Sellars 
means “the kind of inference whose correctness essentially involves the 
conceptual contents of its premises and conclusions” (MIE, 97). 
4 This is a simplified example due to the fact that material inferences are 
non-monotonous, or sensitive to the context of the background claims 
available. 
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ment to a claim as a justification for endorsing it oneself (MIE, 
175). In both cases, the status of being entitled to a commit-
ment is social and normative in nature, i.e., relative to a 
scorekeeper, whose attributions of entitlements themselves 
are similarly open to evaluation by other scorekeepers. 
The default and challenge structure’s primary purpose is 
to stave off the justificatory regress that threatens both of the-
se mechanisms. Since only tautological claims can justify 
themselves, any non-trivial claim must appeal to other claims 
for justificatory support, which then leads to the familiar di-
lemma where either appeal is made to premises that have 
already been used, or the chain of justification becomes infi-
nite, with analogical worries facing the interpersonal mecha-
nism. Brandom’s solution is to admit that although every 
claim is in principle subject to a potential epistemic challenge, 
as a matter of social fact, some claims in the practice are treat-
ed as being such that everyone is by default entitled to make 
them, and that challenging them requires justification in or-
der to be legitimate (MIE, 177). 
The defining idea of MIE is to explain how a community of 
scorekeepers operating on these (simplified) principles can 
come to institute discursive, pragmatic norms sufficient for 
conferring propositional, conceptual, objective semantic con-
tents on their token expressions. My focus here will be on the 
conferral half of the project, and more particularly on the se-
mantically objective status of conceptual contents. Assuming 
that there are discursive norms governing what inferences it 
would be correct and incorrect for the scorekeepers to under-
take and to attribute to each other, what guarantees that these 
norms deserve a specifically semantic interpretation, i.e., that 
it is meaning that these norms confer? In particular, why 
should we think that the norms are in any way related to the 
world of objects which the practice supposedly purports to 
represent, as opposed to being set by a malicious Cartesian 
demon, say? 
A common way to explain how propositional contents 
come to represent the world is by allusion to truth in some 
way, e.g. by the correspondence theory. However, as already 
mentioned, Brandom opts out of a mixed (“two-factor”) ap-
proach to propositional contents, which means he cannot ap-
peal to truth as an explanans anywhere in his project. In fact, 
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he is a deflationist about truth, and sees the primary task as 
explaining what it is that we do in applying the truth locution 
to sentences rather than as giving a substantial semantic ac-
count about the truth predicate itself (MIE, 325-326). 
Another initially promising candidate for explaining se-
mantic objectivity that Brandom rejects is dubbed by him as 
the “I-we” sociality account. According to the I-we account, 
which bears some resemblance to Peirce’s thinking on the end 
of inquiry as pointed out by Vitaly Kiryushchenko (2021), the 
epistemic subject proper is the whole community of rational 
interlocutors understood as a regulative ideal. The ideal 
community sets a kind of epistemic standard on truth in the 
sense that what would be held true by the ideal community 
(or some part of the community in epistemically ideal cir-
cumstances) would coincide with truth, or with what is cor-
rect according to the discursive norms. Brandom however 
famously denies that such a perspective exists: 
What is shared by all discursive perspectives is that there is a 
difference between what is objectively correct in the way of con-
cept application and what is merely taken to be so, not what it 
is—the structure, not the content. (MIE, 600) 
So, whence comes semantic objectivity and the anchoring of 
language in objects if not from truth or from an epistemically 
privileged collective perspective? I believe that here 
Brandom’s answer—the structure, not the content—does not 
quite line up with the more informal phrasings of the criteria 
by which he thinks the project should be judged. But before 
contrasting those criteria, we must briefly clarify what se-
mantic objectivity as a “structural feature” of scorekeeping 
amounts to. 
Above I mentioned that the fundamental move within the 
scorekeeping practice is that of attributing a commitment (to-
gether with its material inferential entailments) to a claim. 
The set of claims which the scorekeeper treats the subject as 
having thus undertaken is contrasted with the set which the 
subject, both according to herself and according to the score-
keeper, acknowledges. So, in effect every scorekeeper keeps 
two sets of “books” on every other subject/scorekeeper: the 
set of commitments that the subject is disposed to assert (i.e., 
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which she acknowledges) and the set that it would be correct 
for her to assert (i.e., which she has undertaken). 
As already mentioned, according to the “official” answer  
of  MIE,  semantic  objectivity  is  a  “structural  feature”  of  
the  scorekeeping  practice.  This means that  the  distinction  
between what is held correct by someone or everyone and 
what  in fact is correct (even according to the scorekeeper 
herself) is  made  from  within  every individual perspective. 
But precisely because every perspective not only makes this 
distinction but is also subject to it, objectivity cannot be de-
fined in terms of any single, epistemically privileged perspec-
tive. 
Brandom supports this somewhat surprising claim by de-
livering objectivity proofs, the purpose of which is to ward 
off two threatening inferences: 
No First-Person Ignorance (p) [p ➝ (I claim that p)] 
No First-Person Error (p) [(I claim that p) ➝ p] 
These inferences are threatening because, if true in the score-
keeping practice, they would make every scorekeeper take 
herself to be omniscient and incorrigible (MIE, 605). Accord-
ing to Brandom’s proofs, which I won’t be reviewing in depth 
here, semantic correctness does not collapse to the scorekeep-
er’s perspective or to what she takes to be correct. In both 
cases, the pivot of the proofs is to show that the antecedents 
and the consequents of the threatening inferences are not in-
compatibility-equivalent, i.e., everything that is incompatible 
with the first is not incompatible with the second, and vice 
versa. The material incompatibility relation is defined in 
terms of commitment and entitlement: two claims are incom-
patible when commitment to one precludes entitlement to the 
other and vice versa (MIE, 160). Here, the distinction between 
being committed and entitled to a claim plays a major role, 
for although both threatening inferences are commitment-
preserving, they are not entitlement-preserving (MIE, 606). 
Brandom admits that passing the objectivity proofs is a 
“fairly weak” merit (MIE, 606). Nonetheless, he also claims 
that it is objectivity enough to meet the requirement for “a 
kind of correctness that answers to how things actually are, 
rather than to how they are taken to be, by anyone (including 
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oneself) or everyone” (MIE, 607). The kernel of Brandom’s 
structural account of semantic objectivity is that it is not the 
semantic theorist’s burden to formulate a set of criteria or a 
method by which we could find the claims that are correctly 
held to be correct within the practice – held correct in an ul-
timate sense, as it were. That matter is left solely to the prac-
tice itself, the “messy retail business of assessing the 
comparative authority of competing evidential and inferential 
claims” (MIE, 601). 
My purpose now is to question whether the structural ac-
count of semantic objectivity and passing of the objectivity 
proofs suffices to fulfill Brandom’s more informal characteri-
zations of the criteria he sets for himself in MIE. To begin 
with, what Brandom thinks is important for semantic objec-
tivity is the source of correctness for evaluating applications of 
conceptual norms, as he clearly states early on: 
The objectivity of conceptual norms requires that any attitude of 
taking, treating, or assessing as correct an application of a con-
cept in forming a belief or making a claim be coherently con-
ceivable as mistaken, because of how things are with the objects the 
belief or claim is about. (MIE, 63, my italics) 
The objectivity of representational content is a feature of the 
practices of assessing the correctness of representations. The sta-
tus of representings as correct or incorrect, successful or unsuc-
cessful, depends on how things are with what is represented, 
rather than on the attitudes of representers. What is distinctive 
of specifically representational correctness is this objectivity—the 
way in which assessments of representational correctness take 
representings to answer to what is represented, rather than to 
how what is represented is taken to be. It is the way in which the 
status being assessed outruns any particular attitude toward it. 
Understanding the objectivity of representational content re-
quires understanding this particular structure of its authority 
and acknowledgement—what it is for those assessing the cor-
rectness of representings to cede authority over them to what is 
represented, to treat their correctness in practice as determined 
by those representeds. (MIE, 78) 
In the next section, I shall argue that passing the objectivity 
proofs is only a necessary and not a sufficient condition to 
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meet the criterion that the source of semantic correctness is 
(at least partially) in the objects which claims made within the 
practice purport to represent. Moreover, in the next section I 
shall argue that MIE already contains the ingredients, if not 
the full argument, for a sufficient condition. 
 
3 Three Levels of Semantic Objectivity 
Above I noted a discrepancy between how Brandom charac-
terizes the criteria of adequacy by which his account for se-
mantic objectivity is to be judged and the objectivity proofs 
he delivers. As I initially pointed out, what Brandom aims for 
is an account where the source of correctness for evaluating 
representings (paradigmatically assertions and inferences, or 
more generally applications of norms) within the scorekeep-
ing practice is at least partially in the objects that the claim-
making practices purport to represent. What the objectivity 
proofs essentially achieve, however, is the merely negative 
point that claims about what is correct (in the sense of being 
true) do not collapse to (are not incompatibility equivalent 
with) claims about who is committed and entitled to what—
not even in the case of the scorekeeper and her whole com-
munity. This is what Brandom wins by showing that the 
threatening inferences No First-Person Ignorance and No First-
Person Error do not hold in the scorekeeping system. The 
problem is that this merely negative claim by itself leaves en-
tirely open what, if anything, does determine which 
representings are correct and which are incorrect; in other 
words, it leaves entirely open the crucial question of the 
source of semantic correctness. 
In order to make this distinction clearer, it is useful to dis-
tinguish between three levels of semantic objectivity that can 
be uncovered in MIE: 
(AI) A norm n is attitude-immanent for community C iff it is not 
possible for everyone in C to be mistaken about the correct ap-
plications of n. 
(AT) A norm n is attitude-transcendent for community C iff it is 
possible for everyone in C to be mistaken about the correct ap-
plications of n. 
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(PO) A norm n is properly objective for community C iff the 
world of objects partially determines the correct applications of 
n.5 
At the lowest tier of objectivity for norms, we find so-called 
attitude-immanent norms, prime examples of which are social 
norms such as greeting gestures and marriage institutions. In 
the case of these non-discursive norms, “it makes no sense to 
suppose that [the community] could be wrong about this sort 
of thing” (MIE, 53). A few specificational remarks should fol-
low the biconditional definition. First of all, the principle is 
bound to incorporate an ineliminable measure of vagueness 
in regard to how finely the norm’s content should be individ-
uated, for it is typically the case that the community members 
do not have robust evaluative intuitions about all possible 
circumstances in which the given norm could be applied. So, 
I take it to be compatible with the (AI) status that a norm’s 
content is not wholly transparent to the community in the 
positive sense that they could not find genuinely novel, as of 
yet unthought-of circumstances of application for the norm, 
although they could not then all be incorrect about how to 
apply it. Second, the collective judgment can be represented 
either by all the mature members separately or by some se-
lect, deferrable group of experts among them. 
The class of norms the objectivity of which (AI) grading 
most readily befits is often called “social norms”; a slightly 
misleading term since all norms have a social character in 
some sense, at least for Brandom. While much more could 
(and should) be said about attitude-immanent social norms, 
e.g., how to distinguish them from mere conventions,6 the 
                                                 
5 As a reviewer pointed out, for Brandom the authority of objects to de-
termine correctness of applications of norms can only ever be partial, not 
complete. The nominal reason for this is explained by his acceptance of 
phenomenalism about norms (see below), though in this instance I cannot 
go into the reasons that drive Brandom to endorse phenomenalism to 
begin with. I agree with the reviewer though that working in the back-
ground here is Kant’s influence and also Sellar’s (1956) criticism of the 
Myth of the Given, which broadly denies the possibility of non-conceptual 
epistemic access to objects. 
6 I refer the reader to Brennan et al. (2013) for a thorough conceptual study 
on social norms. 
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important point here is to contrast them with attitude-
transcendent norms. In contrast to (AI), a norm that is (AT) 
has applications which are not necessarily and sufficiently 
determined as correct by the community’s collective judg-
ment. In particular, Brandom argues that we must under-
stand conceptual norms as distinct from merely social ones 
precisely in that only conceptual norms are rightly called atti-
tude-transcendent (MIE, 53-54). 
The important point to realize now is that passing the ob-
jectivity proofs only amounts to semantic objectivity in the 
(AT) sense. The fact that everyone in a community may intel-
ligibly (take themselves to) be mistaken about the correct ap-
plication of a norm does not entail that it is the world of ob-
jects which determines what the correct applications—if 
any—are. This seminal point has already been appreciated at 
least by Bernd Prien (2010, 454). Importantly, Prien also pro-
poses an interpretation of MIE according to which it does ul-
timately secure semantic objectivity, although as we shall see 
later, I think his argument does not work. 
It may not be so intuitive to think of the difference between 
(AT) and (PO) as a question of levels, which implies a contin-
uum, because they appear to answer different questions. As a 
helpful reviewer put the point to me, whereas (AI) and (AT) 
only concern the criteria for the application of norms, (PO) 
concerns the more fundamental issue of what source deter-
mines the very content of norms; a distinction the reviewer 
proposed to capture in “semantic” and “metasemantic” terms 
respectively. The metasemantic question is about the meta-
physical issue of the source of semantic correctness, of which 
the semantic question about the criteria of application re-
mains neutral. 
There are indeed two distinct senses of “semantic objectivi-
ty” at play here, one concerning the criteria for applicability, 
the other criteria for determination of content. However, my 
purpose in squeezing the two onto one continuum is to clari-
fy Brandom’s claim about the conferral of objective semantic 
contents by discursive norms instituted by the attitudes men-
tioned above. The way I’m inclined to understand his think-
ing here is that the original source in the metasemantic or 
metaphysical issue—what determines the contents of 
norms—is solely with normative attitudes. This is a thesis 
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that he undertakes under the name phenomenalism about norms 
(MIE, 25).7 Once the attitudes have “instituted” norms that 
fulfil the (AI) criteria of applicability, it becomes possible for 
them to fulfil the more demanding (AT) criteria as well. 
However, at this juncture, what is also supposed to change is 
the metasemantic or metaphysical issue concerning the 
source for determining the contents of norms. In effect, the 
source of authority is in a way extended from the attitudes to 
the objects such that the latter come to be “incorporated” in 
the practice, to exercise “mediated” authority of their own 
over the attitudes. This latter thesis goes by the name norma-
tive phenomenalism (MIE, 627). 
The reason why I take it to be justified to situate (AI), (AT), 
and (PO) on a continuum of levels rests with my reading of 
Brandom’s larger project in MIE that seeks to explain the con-
ferral of semantically objective contents by discursive norms 
implicit in practices. The shift from institution to conferral is 
supposed to be a continuous process, which I take means that 
the criteria by which the shift itself is judged as successful 
should be the same as what are used to evaluate institution 
and conferral separately, even if the shift contains an implicit, 
important distinction. There is indeed a kind of a “jump” 
from (AT) to (PO), but one that purports to reflect the qualita-
tive shift which Brandom pursues under the conferral thesis. 
What changes during the conferral is the metasemantic or 
metaphysical source of content, the discursive authority that 
is no longer solely with the attitudes but becomes shared with 
or passed on to the objects. While Brandom appears to think 
that passing the objectivity proofs suffices to cover the shift 
from (AT) to (PO), I side with Prien in that something else is 
required to turn the merely negative claim about the applica-
bility of norms to the positive claim about the determination 
of content. To repeat, the reason why (AT) norms arguably do 
not suffice for representational purport is that, as was seen 
above, a norm being (AT) does not foreclose the possibility 
                                                 
7 I won’t seek to give a strict definition for phenomenalism here, for I be-
lieve its spirit in Brandom’s works is primarily programmatic and thus 
strategically malleable according to the context. However, it is also true 
that the fact exposes Brandom’s key claims to hindering polysemy, as 
noted, e.g., by Jeremy Wanderer (2008, 74, fn.). 
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that its content is indeterminate (i.e., determined by nothing) 
or then it is determined by a Cartesian demon. Were that the 
case, it becomes hard to argue that the norm purported to 
represent anything, much less the world, which is why the 
claim to (PO) status for conceptual norms is crucial for 
Brandom to achieve. 
 
4 The Pragmatist Route to Semantic Objectivity of 
Contents Goes Via Conceptual Realism 
Above I argued that Brandom’s official account of semantic 
objectivity, which rests on the objectivity proofs, does not suf-
fice to meet the informal yet clear criteria that he sets for him-
self elsewhere in MIE. What remains unclear with regard to 
the semi-metaphorical conferral claim is how norms that are 
(AT) by their objectivity level may explain the rise of seman-
tic contents robust enough to meet the (PO) standard. In this 
section, I shall argue that the missing piece is already inher-
ent in MIE, although Brandom started developing the details 
of the answer only in his later works. 
As I already explained, the shape of the problem of seman-
tic objectivity for Brandom is to explain how the objects of the 
world can come to be incorporated in or mediated by our dis-
cursive attitudes in the sense that the original authority of the 
attitudes is in a way extended to the worldly objects. The 
sense in which the world is “incorporated” into practices 
should be initially differentiated from the way in which 
sounds and marks merely convey intentionality. This text 
conveys the intentionality of my assertions to you, but in no 
way do the pixels (or the ink of the printer) exercise authority 
over the correctness of what I say, which is only to point out 
the familiar idea of the sign’s arbitrariness. Brandom’s idea of 
“lumpy practices” seeks to capture a more robust sense in 
which the world partakes in discursive practices, somewhat 
like bats and balls “partake” in baseball, where their purely 
material aspects, while in a sense contingent, are not as arbi-
trary as those of the signs we use in making assertions (MIE, 
632). 
How this works in practice can be appreciated by the (in 
Brandomian circles) hackneyed example of the litmus paper 
test. Consider the following causal chain of events: 
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1. The subject has a discursive attitude describable as a dis-
position to draw the inference “If some substance tastes 
sour, it will turn litmus paper red.” 
2. The subject has a perceptual experience of a substance that 
tastes sour. 
3. The subject has a consequent perceptual experience of the 
substance turning litmus paper blue. 
4. The subject loses her attitude-disposition to infer “If some 
substance tastes sour, it will turn litmus paper red.” 
In this example, we can see the causal entanglement of prac-
tices and the world. On the side of the practices, we have 
events (or states) (1.) and (4.), and on the side of the world, 
we have events (2.) and (3.). (Alternatively we could replace, 
in this instance, the term “practices” with that of “abilities,” 
for although in MIE Brandom’s official stance is that the rele-
vant dispositions can only emerge in the context of 
intersubjective practices, elsewhere he is less committal about 
this point.) Of course, the whole chain of events is part of the 
same world, i.e., the distinction between discursive practic-
es/abilities and the world is drawn from within the world 
when viewed in purely causal terms. A similar story on the 
side of action could be told where the subject’s attitudes are 
the cause of changes in the world rather than themselves 
causally changed by how the world is (Brandom 2008a, 178; 
MIE, 332-333). 
The chain of events (1.)-(4.) above gives us a rudimentary 
grasp of how the world causally constricts the practic-
es/abilities paradigmatically by affecting our dispositions to 
draw inferences.8 Of course, not all such causal effects should 
be counted as having anything to do with how the facts of the 
                                                 
8 The relevant practices or abilities are algorithmic in kind, the core of 
which Brandom identifies as a four-step feedback loop of action and per-
ception. In Between Saying and Doing (esp. Ch. 1-2) he develops a new type 
of regimented logical vocabulary to discuss how such relatively simple 
systems, which arguably can be taken to exhibit primitive forms of a prac-
tical, know-how type of intentionality, can give rise to the theoretical, 
know-that type of intentionality. I cannot here discuss the details of the 
project. 
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world justify moves in discursive practices.9 How is it then 
that the world normatively constrains our practices/abilities? 
The key idea here is Brandom’s commitment to conceptual 
realism, encapsulated by the notion inherited from Frege that 
facts just are true claims (i.e., what is claimed and not the 
claiming of it) (MIE, 327). Seen from the subject’s own per-
spective, the claim to which she acknowledges commitment 
at (1.) turns out to be false in the transition from (2.) to (3.), 
i.e., in the face of the perceived fact that there is a sour-tasting 
substance that turns litmus paper blue instead of red. Here, 
the crucial difference between a claim merely taken as true 
and a claim that is true is made from within the practic-
es/abilities as opposed to within the world: it is the differ-
ence between the subject attributing commitments (either to 
others or to her past self) and undertaking them herself (in 
the present). Since the subject-relative normative status of a 
claim as a fact depends on whether it is only attributed or also 
undertaken, and since the attitudes are already something 
involved in the causal realm of facts, the mechanism by 
which facts come to exercise authority over attitudes is given 
by the scorekeeping apparatus considered as causally inte-
grated with the world in complex ways. 
The key claim of conceptual realism is that both  facts and 
attitudes are conceptually structured according  to  two dif-
ferent readings of the generic material incompatibility  rela-
tion. On the side of the world, the concept of the object can be 
understood as “repelling” incompatible properties under an 
alethic sense of necessity. On the side of the practices, subjects 
can be understood as “repelling” incompatible commitments 
under a deontic sense of necessity. In Brandom’s words: 
It is impossible for one and the same object to have incompatible 
properties at the same time. But it is merely impermissible for one 
and the same subject to have incompatible commitments at the 
same time. (2008a, 191) 
                                                 
9 Brandom (2001, 107) is strongly critical of reliabilist theories of justifica-
tion that take causal, probabilistically reliable processes as at least in some 
cases sufficient to justify beliefs and assertions. I cannot enter this debate 
here, but the important point is that for Brandom, purely causal relations 
are not sufficient to account for the justification of beliefs or assertions: the 
normative element is also required. 
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We can now better appreciate in what sense the world be-
comes “incorporated” in or “mediated” by discursive practic-
es, following the litmus paper example above. Brandom’s 
idea is that the succession of events (1.)-(4.) can be under-
stood from two different modal perspectives, depending on 
whether it is described objectively as what does happen or 
subjectively as what ought to or may happen. The world and 
the practices are ontologically speaking two halves of the 
same event or process, structured in the generic modal sense 
of a material incompatibility relation, which Brandom takes 
to be the key conceptual notion. 
However, at this point it seems that it would be equally 
correct to say that the practices are incorporated in or mediat-
ed by the world rather than the other way around. To make 
an already impressive amalgamation of theses more compli-
cated, Brandom also pursues an explanatory order he attrib-
utes to Hegel, according to which the objective side of alethic 
modal incompatibility relations must be understood and ex-
plained in terms of the subjective side of deontic modal in-
compatibility processes (2002, Ch.6). 
It is noteworthy that the term “conceptual realism” ap-
pears nowhere in MIE, and thus it is appropriate to wonder 
whether the idea really is relevant for the issue of semantic 
objectivity as opposed to a late-coming, separate topic. The 
impression is reinforced by the fact that MIE’s primary 
pragmatist strategy centers its explanatory force on the score-
keeping practice, which assumedly is supposed to be inde-
pendent of ontological issues concerning the constitution of 
the world. Furthermore, there is an active reason for 
Brandom to avoid undertaking any unnecessary ontological 
commitments as a consequence of his semantic theorizing, 
namely his fundamental opposition to the truth conditional 
strategy and the correspondence theory of truth that goes 
with it. Brandom accuses the correspondence theorist of con-
fusing acts of claiming that something is true with the content 
of what is thereby said in the sense that what is true – i.e., the 
facts—is supposed to explain what it is for a claim to be true, 
i.e., its content understood as truth conditions (MIE, 330). 
That being said, when Brandom echoes Frege in claiming 
that “Facts just are true claims,” a careful reading shows that 
he is not by that token merely making the deflationist nega-
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tive claim that truth is not a semantically explanatory relation 
between language and world. Instead, towards the end of 
MIE he proposes an alternative way to construe that relation: 
Concepts conceived as inferential roles of expressions do not 
serve as epistemological intermediaries, standing between us 
and what is conceptualized by them. This is not because there is 
no causal order consisting of particulars, interaction with which 
supplies the material for thought. It is rather because all of these el-
ements are themselves conceived as thoroughly conceptual, not as con-
trasting with the conceptual. (MIE, 622, my italics) 
The conception of concepts as inferentially articulated permits a 
picture of thought and of the world that thought is about as 
equally, and in the favored cases identically, conceptually articu-
lated. (Ibid.) 
Condensed here is the main thesis of what Brandom later on 
has dubbed conceptual realism, or the idea that the world as 
such is conceptually structured. There is no ontological catego-
ry distinction between predicates and properties: instead 
there is identity. The nature of the identity is modal, split be-
tween the alethic and deontic sides (2019, 54). How exactly the 
sides are supposed to be combined is of course a massive 
question, one that Brandom does not tackle in MIE and which 
thus falls outside the scope of this paper. 
But if Brandom does indeed espouse conceptual realism 
already in MIE as the key to the conferral thesis that is to 
patch over the jump from (AT) to (PO) objectivity, why does 
he not explicitly say so? One reason I can think of is that at 
the time he did not have a well-thought-out idea of how to 
connect conceptual realism as an independent metaphysical 
stance with the scorekeeping practice, or to give an encom-
passing enough of account of it. Yet the idea that the world 
and discursive practices are causally integrated with each 
other is clearly stated and important for securing the condi-
tion, which Brandom sees as central, that the world serves as 
a dual constraint (normative and causal) on practices, even if 
the point is never brought into detailed discussion (MIE, 331, 
332, fn.). 
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5 Why Conceptual Realism Is Essential for Proper 
Objectivity 
To conclude this paper, I shall argue against certain alterna-
tive ways to understand Brandom’s claim that the scorekeep-
ing practice is able to confer objective semantic contents on 
token expressions. 
Andrea Clausen (2004) for one argues that conceptual real-
ism is non-essential and in fact a distraction from Brandom’s 
aim of accounting for objective contents in terms of discursive 
practices. The basic reason why she considers conceptual re-
alism redundant is that she thinks Brandom’s scorekeeping 
account alone can afford an explanation of how token expres-
sions can come to exhibit representational purport. The prob-
lem, however, is that she does not adequately distinguish 
between attitude-transcendence and what I have called prop-
er objectivity, namely between the negative claim that every-
one could be incorrect in (some) of their assertions and 
inferences and the positive claim that it is the world that de-
termines the semantic incorrectness of assertions and infer-
ences. Again, the fundamental reason why attitude-
transcendence does not amount to proper objectivity is that, 
even if every subject in practice necessarily presumes a differ-
ence between what is taken to be correct and what is correct, 
and that there is only one correct set of assertions and infer-
ences everyone should acknowledge, it does not follow that it 
is the world of objects which determines the identity of the set, 
or even that there is such a set. Here’s a telling excerpt of this 
non-sequitur: 
What we claim to be correct can always turn out to be incorrect. 
Put alternatively, this means that we rub ourselves against a re-
sistant reality. Second, what is correct is supposed to be inde-
pendent of what anybody or all take to be correct. Put 
alternatively, this means that we refer to one and the same 
world. (Clausen 2004, 217) 
In fact, the reason our claims can always turn out to be incor-
rect, as far as the scorekeeping practice is concerned, may be 
that the contents are actually indeterminate or then deter-
mined by a Cartesian demon. And even if everyone agrees 
that what is correct is independent of what everyone takes to 
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be correct, it remains possible that there is no reference to one 
and the same world. 
Ronald Loeffler (2017) sees the problem between deriving 
(PO) from (AT) without further argument more clearly. Re-
turning to the litmus paper parable, what Brandom wants to 
say is that by treating two of her commitments as materially 
incompatible with each other, the subject takes her commit-
ments to be purporting to represent a singular object, namely 
the natural kind acid, for objects are (in part) defined as those 
entities which repel incompatible properties in the alethic 
modal sense. Loeffler raises the question, however, of why 
we should interpret the subject as purporting to represent an 
object by taking two of her commitments to be incompatible, 
for on the face of it we might equally well interpret her taking 
the incompatibility to amount to nothing more than a prohi-
bition against endorsing two given assertion types (Loeffler 
2017, 147). In other words, how does the intra-practice matter 
of which assertions are taken to be incompatible translate into 
the extra-practice matter of representational purport? 
Loeffler’s answer on behalf of Brandom is that, although 
from our point of view as external theorists the subject of the 
acid parable is not yet definitely purporting to represent any-
thing beyond her practices or abilities, from the subject’s own 
perspective it appears that the acid itself serves as the exter-
nal standard of her commitments, which hence purport to 
represent how things really stand with acidic substances 
(2017, 148).10 
The distinction between the native subject’s own perspec-
tive and that of the external theorist’s cannot, however, offer 
a sufficient reason to claim that the scorekeeping practice in-
cludes norms with representational purport or (PO) objectivi-
ty grading. The reason is, again, that each of the predicates 
                                                 
10 Note that saying this is compatible with Brandom’s insistence that alt-
hough the subject is from her own point of view purporting to represent 
objects, the purport may be completely implicit in her practices or abilities 
in that she may not be able to explicitly assert that her commitments rep-
resent something external (Loeffler 2017, 149). The distinction between an 
implicit ability to do something that is independent of the explicit ability 
to say what one is doing is as important to Brandom’s pragmatist account 
of intentionality, though it is also largely orthogonal to the issues I’m ad-
dressing here. 
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“takes to purport to represent an object” and “purports to 
represent an object,” or alternatively “takes to be correct” and 
“is correct,” and the predicates have distinct extensions, and 
claiming one does not entail the other. In particular, since 
Brandom’s final major statement in MIE is that we are in fact 
engaged in the scorekeeping practice ourselves (the move he 
calls “the collapse of perspectives”), any difference to the ex-
tent which so starkly distinguishes between the native score-
keeper and her external interpreter cannot hope to be 
adequate as an account of actual representational purport, if 
by “actual” we mean whatever it is that we do in purporting 
to represent objects. Applying Loeffler’s response to our own 
case, even if it is true that it (necessarily) appears to us that we 
are responsive to objects of the world when encountering in-
compatible commitments, it does not follow that we really are 
purporting to represent such objects.11 
To end this section, I wish to reject one further argument 
which seeks to establish representational purport in the 
scorekeeping practice without resorting to conceptual realism 
as an independent metaphysical theory. Bernd Prien (2010) 
argues that what is needed to ensure proper objectivity is a 
special norm called the “principle of rational rectification” 
(PRR). The principle of rational rectification, which Brandom 
introduces in Between Saying and Doing, states that subjects 
are obliged to rectify the incompatible commitments they 
have committed themselves to. Indeed, as we already saw in 
this section, the principle in part defines the concept of the 
discursive subject for Brandom (2008a, 193). Prien claims that 
[p]ractices that include such a norm of rational rectification war-
rant an interpretation according to which the conceptual norms 
and thus the deontic statuses of the speakers are not determined 
by the deontic attitudes present in a community, but rather by 
the way the world is. Whenever a speaker runs into incompati-
ble commitments because of the way the world is (for example, 
because there are sour-tasting liquids that do not turn litmus 
paper red), she is obliged to modify some of the inferential rela-
tions she acknowledges. In order to make sense of this obliga-
tion, we have to assume that it is the world that determines 
                                                 
11 Loeffler also sees conceptual realism as an important part of Brandom’s 
later attempts to account for semantic objectivity (2017, 178-179). 
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what follows from what, and not the individual subjects, the ex-
perts, or the community as a whole. For even inferential rela-
tions accepted by the community as a whole have to be modi-
modified if this is the best way to remove an incompatibility. 
(2010, 455) 
Prien claims that the PRR is a sufficient condition to warrant 
the properly objective status to conceptual contents in the 
discursive practices, for it is the only way to make sense of 
this obligation. It is difficult to see how that follows however, 
for it is perfectly intelligible that everyone in the practice is 
obligated to rectify their incompatible commitments and that 
the world does not determine what commitments really are 
incompatible. Furthermore, it is not clear how precisely the 
world is supposed to oblige subjects to rectify their incompat-
ible commitments other than in the metaphorical, causal 
sense of obligation (Brandom 2008b). 
A similar point applies to another special norm also men-
tioned by Prien, which we might call the intersubjective prin-
ciple of rational rectification as opposed to the intrasubjective 
PRR. The intersubjective PRR, first proposed by Loeffler 
(2005), states that different subjects A and B are obligated to 
rectify their commitments that are incompatible with some 
commitments of the other. For one, the intersubjective PRR 
seems to complicate Brandom’s claim that we can define sub-
jects as units of accountability qua subjects to intrasubjective 
PRR. If PRR is extended from intra- to intersubjective incom-
patibility relations, are we to conclude that two distinct sub-
jects can form a singular unit of discursive accountability? 
More acutely though, it remains unclear how PRR in either 
its intra- or intersubjective versions is supposed to entail that 
subjects really are responsible to the world in what concerns 
the correctness of their commitments. For the issue of in virtue 
of what commitments really are incompatible is orthogonal to 
whether and in what sense subjects are obligated to rectify 
their incompatible commitments. Even if it is the world that 
somehow non-metaphorically obliges the subjects to rectify 
their incompatible commitments, something which Brandom 
explicitly denies (2008b), it is a different matter to establish 
whether the world also determines (and does not merely ap-
pear to determine) which commitments are incompatible. So 
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PRR alone does not entail that the scorekeeping practice that 
includes it also includes norms with representational purport. 
 
Conclusions 
To summarize, the crucial problem for Brandom’s pragmatist 
project in MIE is to explain how the norms instituted by atti-
tudes can confer propositional contents robust enough to be 
about worldly objects. In order to achieve this, he argues that 
the practice incorporates or mediates objects, somewhat like 
games “incorporate” physical objects into their rules. Howev-
er, a prerequisite for the incorporation is that Brandom must 
undertake ontological commitments regarding the nature of 
the objects as such, namely that they too are conceptually 
structured. The essential idea of conceptual realism already 
operative in MIE is that the subject/object divide can be ex-
plained in terms of the modal divide between alethic and de-
ontic halves. This, I have argued, is Brandom’s best strategy 
in MIE for explaining why the scorekeeping practice should 
be interpreted as including genuinely representational prop-
erties. 
The cost of embracing conceptual realism, however, is that 
it ultimately means expanding the base explananda with 
which Brandom operates in MIE. The official strategy of the 
book is to explain how norms instituted by attitudes may 
confer propositional contents that are objective and represen-
tational in the sense that they normatively answer to the 
world of objects. The main explanatory primitive on the sub-
jective side is the concept normative attitude. However, there 
are no corresponding primitives available on the objective 
side to argue for the truth of conceptual realism. It is as if in 
the course of the book Brandom is driven to embrace concep-
tual realism because of his starting point with normative atti-
tudes, which alone cannot secure an objective enough relation 
to the world to establish representational purport. In an inter-
esting narrative twist, this result is not too different from 
what Brandom considers to be a central mistake of early ana-
lytic philosophy: 
Some previous varieties of logical atomism had distinguished 
themselves by their insistence that the only way any expression, 
sentential or not, could have content or contribute to the content 
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of an expression of which it is a part is by standing for or repre-
senting something. Thus, not only did these views grasp the net-
tle of commitment to negative and conditional facts, they also 
were committed to “not” and “if… then…” standing for some 
element in a complex state of affairs. The undertakers of such 
commitments are admirable more for their conceptual heroism 
than for their good sense. (MIE, 76) 
The lesson here is that we should be mindful about the possi-
ble ontological implications our theorizing on language and 
meaning leaves us with, for otherwise we risk putting the cart 
before the horse. Brandom’s appeal to conceptual realism 
without sufficient argumentative support risks doing that, 
although as I have shown he has taken measures to rectify the 
matter later on. The final word on the matter belongs to fur-
ther study, however. 
 
University of Tampere  
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